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“CONSTITUTIONAL	  MYTHS”	  	  
AND	  “DEMOCRATIC”	  POLITICS:	  	  
TWO	  TAKES	  ON	  THE	  AMERICAN	  CONSTITUTION	  
Sanford	  Levinson	  *	  
	   RAY	  RAPHAEL,	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  MYTHS:	  WHAT	  WE	  GET	  WRONG	  AND	  HOW	  TO	  GET	  IT	  RIGHT	  (2013).	  Pp.	  336.	  Hardcover	  $26.95.	  	  	   ANTHONY	   KING,	   THE	   FOUNDING	   FATHERS	   V.	   THE	   PEOPLE:	   PARADOXES	   OF	   AMERICAN	  DEMOCRACY	  (2012).	  Pp.	  256.	  Hardcover	  $31.50.	  	   Even	  in	  a	  crowded	  field,	  Constitutional	  Myths:	  What	  We	  Get	  Wrong	  and	  How	  to	  
Get	  It	  Right,	  by	  Ray	  Raphael,1	  and	  The	  Founding	  Fathers	  v.	  the	  People:	  Paradoxes	  of	  
American	  Democracy,	  by	  Anthony	  King,2	  are	  welcome	  additions	  to	  anyone’s	  shelf	  (or	  Kindle),	  well	  worth	   reading	   and	   reflecting	   upon.	   As	   their	   titles	   suggest,	   these	   are	  books	  with	  strong	  theses,	  attempting	  to	  dispel	  what	  has	  become	  conventional	  wis-­‐dom	  about	  the	  United	  States	  Constitution	  and	  its	  underlying	  commitments.	  Both	  try	  to	  place	  what	  came	  out	  of	  Philadelphia	  into	  the	  context	  of	  political	  ideas	  both	  of	  the	  time	  and,	  especially	  in	  King’s	  book,	  subsequent	  developments	  in	  American	  political	  thought.	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  both	  are	  quite	  short.	  King	  begins	  his	  book	  by	  describing	  it	  as	  “an	  extended	  essay.”3	  Raphael	  has	  basically	  written	  a	  set	  of	  eight	  short	   essays.	   Both	   are	  well	  written;	   they	  would	  make	   an	   interesting	   joint	   assign-­‐ment	  in	  a	  challenging	  undergraduate	  or	  graduate	  course	  (or	  law	  school	  seminar).	  There	   is,	   however,	   an	   interesting	   tension	   between	   the	   two	   books.	   Even	   as	  Raphael	   effectively	   demonstrates	   that	  many	  widely	   believed	   current	   understand-­‐ings	  of	  the	  Constitution	  and	  its	  Framers	  are	  flatly	  wrong	  and	  much	  in	  need	  of	  cor-­‐rection,	  he	  appears	  to	  remain	  an	  admirer	  of	  the	  document	  itself.	  He	  writes	  that	  our	  “old	   rules”	  have	   “by	  and	   large	  .	  .	  .	   served	  us	  well.”4	  What	  has	  gone	  off	   track	   is	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  actual	  history	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  including,	  most	  importantly,	  the	  values	  underlying	  its	  formation	  and	  then	  ratification.	  More	  particularly,	  we	  tend	  to	  forget	  how	  much	  it	  was	  the	  product	  of	  a	  political	  movement	  that	  emphasized	  the	  desirability	  of	  creating	  a	  strong	  national	  government	  with	  the	  capacities,	  including	  
                                                            	   *	   W.	  St.	  John	  Garwood	  and	  W.	  St.	  John	  Garwood	  Jr.	  Centennial	  Chair	  in	  Law,	  University	  of	  Texas	  Law	  School;	  Professor	  of	  Government,	  University	  of	  Texas	  at	  Austin.	  	  	  	   1.	  	   RAY	  RAPHAEL,	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  MYTHS:	  WHAT	  WE	  GET	  WRONG	  AND	  HOW	  TO	  GET	  IT	  RIGHT	  (2013).	  	  	   2.	  	   ANTHONY	  KING,	  THE	  FOUNDING	  FATHERS	  V.	  THE	  PEOPLE:	  PARADOXES	  OF	  AMERICAN	  DEMOCRACY	  (2012).	  	  	   3.	  	   Id.	  at	  ix.	  	  	   4.	  	   RAPHAEL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  xiii.	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those	  of	  taxation,	  to	  establish	  itself	  as	  a	  truly	  functioning	  country.	  Although	   Raphael	   presents	   a	   withering	   critique	   of	   “originalism”	   in	   his	   final	  chapter,5	  he	  himself	  could	  be	  placed	  within	  the	  camp	  of	  at	  least	  moderate	  “original-­‐ists”	  inasmuch	  as	  he	  clearly	  thinks	  that	  it	  is	  important	  that	  we	  get	  our	  history	  right.	  We	   have	   as	   a	   society	   been	   ill-­‐served	   by	   persons	   and	   movements	   who	   have,	   by	  adopting	   certain	   “myths,”	   gotten	  our	   constitutional	  history	  profoundly	  wrong	  and	  are,	  therefore,	  misdirecting	  the	  contemporary	  debate	  about	  constitutional	  meaning.	  Anthony	  King,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	   can	  be	  described	  much	  more	  as	  a	   critic	  of	  the	   Constitution.	   Or,	   perhaps	  more	   precisely,	   he	   is	   struck	   by	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  Americans	  accept	  with	  apparent	  equanimity	  a	  Constitution	  that	  was	  intended,	  and	  continues,	  to	  be	  remarkably	  “undemocratic”	  in	  many	  fundamental	  respects,	  not	  on-­‐ly	  when	  compared	  (and	  contrasted)	  with	  many	  constitutions	  abroad,	  but	  even	  more	  strikingly,	  when	  placed	  next	  to	  many	  American	  state	  constitutions	  that	  reflect	  a	  far	  greater	  commitment	  to	  democratic	  procedures	  and	  popular	  rule.	  As	  someone	  who	  has	  written	  a	  book	  entitled	  Our	  Undemocratic	  Constitution,6	  and	  whose	  most	  recent	  book	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  United	  States	  indeed	  contains	  not	  merely	  a	  single	  consti-­‐tution	   but	   fifty-­‐one—and	   that	   all	   of	   the	   fifty	   state	   constitutions	   can	   be	   said	   to	   be	  more	  democratic,	  many	  strikingly	  so,	  than	  the	  national	  counterpart7—I	  am	  predis-­‐posed	  to	  be	  (and	  am	  in	   fact)	  extremely	  receptive	  to	  King’s	  arguments.	  King	  amply	  vindicates	  the	  view	  that	  “strangers”	  can	  often	  see	  aspects	  of	  a	  political	  or	  social	  sys-­‐tem	  that	  “natives”	  are	  prone	  to	  miss.8	  
What	  are	  the	  “myths”	  that	  prevent	  an	  accurate	  understanding	  of	  the	  Constitution?	  Raphael	   focuses	   on	   eight	   such	   “myths.”	   The	  most	   important,	   perhaps,	   is	   the	  subject	  of	  his	   first	  chapter	  and	  then	  again,	  slightly	  rephrased,	  of	  his	   fourth.9	  Thus,	  his	  initial	  “myth”	  is	  that	  “[t]he	  framers	  of	  the	  Constitution	  opposed	  a	  strong	  federal	  government.”10	  A	  similar	  myth	  is	  that	  “[t]he	  framers	  were	  guided	  by	  clear	  principles	  of	  limited	  government.”11	  The	  general	  format	  of	  all	  eight	  chapters	  is	  to	  concede	  that	  all	  of	  the	  “myths”	  rest	  on	  a	  “kernel	  of	  truth,”12	  but	  he	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  demonstrate—and	  I	  use	  the	  word	  advisedly—that	  the	  kernel	  of	  truth	  is	  outweighed	  by	  much	  other	  evidence	  pointing	  to	  a	  quite	  different	  conclusion.	  To	  be	  sure,	  those	  who	  drafted	  the	  Constitution	  were	  scarcely	  devotees	  of	  “unlimited”	  government,	  but,	  obviously,	  that	  condition	   is	  met	   once	   there	   is	   a	   single	   limit	   on	   governmental	   power	   (such	   as	   the	  ability	  to	  pass	  ex	  post	  facto	  laws	  or	  grant	  titles	  of	  nobility).	  The	  problem,	  from	  then	  until	  now,	  is	  to	  discern	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  limits.	  Consider,	  after	  all,	  the	  statement	  of	  the	  Pennsylvania	  Gazette	  on	  September	  5,	  1787	  (before,	  of	  course,	  anyone	  knew	  the	  
                                                            	   5.	  	   Id.	  at	  153-­‐75.	  	   6.	  	   SANFORD	   LEVINSON,	   OUR	   UNDEMOCRATIC	   CONSTITUTION:	  WHERE	   THE	   CONSTITUTION	   GOES	  WRONG	   (AND	  HOW	  WE	  THE	  PEOPLE	  CAN	  CORRECT	  IT)	  (2006).	  	   7.	  	   SANFORD	  LEVINSON,	  FRAMED:	  AMERICA’S	  51	  CONSTITUTIONS	  AND	  THE	  CRISIS	  OF	  GOVERNANCE	  (2012).	  	  	  	   8.	  	   See	  generally	  KING,	  supra	  note	  2.	  	   9.	  	   See	  id.	  	   10.	  	   RAPHAEL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  1.	  	   11.	  	   Id.	  at	  57.	  	   12.	  	   Id.	  at	  1-­‐2,	  15-­‐16,	  36-­‐37,	  57-­‐58,	  77-­‐78,	  103-­‐04,	  131-­‐32,	  153-­‐54.	  
2
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actualities	  of	  the	  decisions	  made	  at	  the	  Convention):	  “The	  Year	  1776	  is	  celebrated	  for	  a	  revolution	  in	  favor	  of	  Liberty.	  The	  year	  1787,	  it	  is	  expected,	  will	  be	  celebrated	  with	  equal	  joy,	  for	  a	  revolution	  in	  favor	  of	  Government.”13	  Some	  of	  the	  delegates	  in	  Philadelphia	  undoubtedly	  wanted	  a	  stronger	  national	  government	  than	  did	  others,	  and,	   as	  Raphael	  makes	   clear,	   James	  Madison	   in	   particular	   left	   the	   city	   immensely	  frustrated	  over	  the	  unwillingness	  of	  his	  colleagues	  to	  grant	  Congress	  a	  power	  to	  ve-­‐to	  any	  and	  all	  state	  legislation	  that	  it	  thought	  contrary	  to	  the	  national	  interest.14	  But	  Raphael	  powerfully	  demonstrates	  that	  even	  those	  with	  a	  weaker	  vision	  than	  Madi-­‐son’s	  nonetheless,	  in	  effect,	  agreed	  with	  the	  Gazette	  that	  a	  far	  stronger	  government	  than	  that	  currently	  existing	  would	  be	  necessary.	  There	  may	  have	  been	   fans	  of	   the	  Articles	  of	  Confederation	   in	  1787	  America,	  but	  they	  certainly	  were	  not	  well	  represented	  in	  Philadelphia.	  And	  even	  some	  skep-­‐tical	  delegates	  like	  Robert	  Yates	  and	  John	  Lansing	  from	  New	  York,	  who	  chose	  in	  ef-­‐fect	  to	  stalk	  out	  of	  the	  Convention	  rather	  than	  try	  to	  demonstrate	  why	  enhancement	  of	  national	  power	  was	  a	  bad	  idea,	  chose	  to	  remain	  faithful	  to	  their	  vow	  of	  absolute	  silence	  rather	  than	  to	  emulate	  Paul	  Revere	  and	  spread	  the	  word	  that	  the	  Philadel-­‐phia	   Convention	   had	   been	   taken	   over	   basically	   by	   strong	   nationalists.15	   In	   any	  event,	  there	  was	  general	  agreement	  by	  supporters	  of	  the	  new	  Constitution	  that	  the	  government	   created	   by	   the	   Articles	   of	   Confederation	   was	   barely	   entitled	   to	   the	  name.	  California	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House	  Jess	  Unruh	  once	  commented	  that	  “[m]oney	  is	  the	   mother’s	   milk	   of	   politics.”16	   Even	  more	   so	   is	   money,	   derived	   from	   taxes,	   the	  mother’s	  milk	   of	   government	   in	   general.	   The	  national	   government	   created	  by	   the	  Articles	   was	   notoriously	   unable	   to	   raise	   any	   money,	   not	   least	   so	   because	   it	   was	  without	   power	   to	   tax	   individuals	   directly.	   Instead,	   the	   Congress	   issued	   “requisi-­‐tions”	   to	  the	  states,	  hoping	  that	   they	  would	  be	  paid.	  As	  Robert	  Livingston	  told	  the	  New	  York	  ratifying	  convention	  on	  June	  27,	  1788,	  the	  requisitions,	  in	  fact,	  were	  noth-­‐ing	  more	  than	  “pompous	  petitions	  for	  charity,”17	  no	  more	  effective	  than	  most	  con-­‐temporary	   end-­‐of-­‐year	   appeals	   arriving	   in	   the	   mail	   from	   charities	   who	   present	  sometimes	  terrible	  pictures	  of	  what	  can	  happen	  should,	  as	  is	  overwhelmingly	  likely,	  we	  fail	  to	  contribute.	  Puppies	  will	  die;	  people	  will	  go	  unfed;	  and,	  in	  the	  instant	  case,	  government	  will	   go	  unfunded.	  Thus	   “[i]n	   the	   requisition	  of	   1786—the	   last	   before	  the	   Constitution—Congress	  mandated	   that	   states	   pay	   $3,800,000,	   but	   it	   collected	  
                                                            	   13.	  	   Id.	  at	  2.	  	   14.	  	   	  Id.	   at	   84-­‐86;	   Raphael	   goes	   on	   to	   include	   a	   number	   of	   other	   nationalist	   proposals	   proffered	   by	  Madison,	  including	  the	  power	  to	  charter	  corporations,	  which	  were	  rejected.	  See	  id.	  at	  99-­‐101.	  	  	  	   15.	  	   David	  Robertson,	  in	  his	  recent	  close	  study	  of	  the	  compromises	  that	  took	  place	  during	  the	  Conven-­‐tion,	  divides	  the	  delegates	  into	  “broad”	  and	  “narrow”	  nationalists,	  all	  of	  whom,	  though,	  agreed	  that	  con-­‐tinuing	   under	   the	   Articles	   was	   basically	   untenable.	   See	   DAVID	   ROBERTSON,	   THE	   ORIGINAL	   COMPROMISE	  (2013).	  	  	  	   16.	  	   Steven	  Greenhut,	  Arcane	  Debate	   Is	   Animated	   by	  What’s	   at	   Stake:	  Money,	   SAN	  DIEGO	  UNION	  TRIB.,	  Aug.	   30,	   2013,	   http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/aug/30/arcane-­‐debate-­‐is-­‐animated-­‐by-­‐whats-­‐at-­‐stake-­‐money/.	  	  	   17.	  	   CALVIN	   H.	   JOHNSON,	   RIGHTEOUS	   ANGER	   AT	   THE	   WICKED	   STATES:	   THE	   MEANING	   OF	   THE	   FOUNDERS’	  CONSTITUTION	   15	   (2005)	   (quoting	   Robert	   Livingston,	   Address	   to	   the	   New	   York	   Convention	   (June	   7,	  1788)).	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only	  $663.”18	  The	  government	  established	  by	  the	  Articles	  did	  not	  have	  to	  be	  “over-­‐thrown,”	  since	  it	  was	  substantially	  dying	  of	  starvation.	  This	   leads	   directly	   to	   the	   second	   “myth,”	   that	   “[t]he	   framers	   hated	   taxes.”19	  One	  does	  not	  have	  to	  believe	  that	  they	  loved	  the	  idea	  of	  being	  taxed.	  Who	  does?	  But	  one	  can	  be	  quite	  certain	  that	  almost	  all	  of	   the	  delegates	  would	  have	  subscribed	  to	  Oliver	  Wendell	  Holmes’s	  reminder,	  some	  140	  years	  later,	  that	  “[t]axes	  are	  what	  we	  pay	  for	  civilized	  society.”20	  Perhaps	  Holmes	  should	  have	  instead	  said	  that	  taxes	  are	  absolutely	  essential	   to	  assuring	  both	  the	  “common	  defense”	  and	  the	  “general	  Wel-­‐fare”	   that	   are	   announced	   to	   be	   among	   the	   essential	   purposes	   of	   the	   new	   govern-­‐ment	  being	  designed	  in	  Philadelphia.	  The	  requisition	  system	  had	  to	  go.	  It	  would	  be	  replaced	  with	  the	  most	  basic	  power	  of	  Congress,	  set	  out	   in	  the	  very	   first	  clause	  of	  Article	  I,	  Section	  8,	  to	  “tax”	  and	  then	  “spend”	  for	  these	  purposes.	  Raphael	  is	  no	  fool.	  He	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  there	  might	  be	  unnecessary	  taxes	  or	  that	  given	  taxes	  could	  be	  too	  high,	  but	  that	  is	  something	  entirely	  different	  from	  any	  argument	   that	   the	   framers	  were	  neo-­‐libertarians	  who	  would	  have	   agreed	   that	   al-­‐most	  all	  taxes	  constitute	  theft	  from	  the	  pockets	  of	  the	  citizenry.	  Raphael	  concludes	  his	  chapter	  on	  taxes	  by	  quoting	  the	  Father	  of	  our	  Country,	  who	  in	  his	   iconic	  Fare-­‐well	  Address	  adjured	  his	   fellow	  Americans	  to	  “bear	   in	  mind	  that	  towards	  the	  pay-­‐ments	  of	  debts	  there	  must	  be	  revenue;	  that	  to	  have	  revenue	  there	  must	  be	  taxes.”21	  Even	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  “no	  taxes	  can	  be	  devised	  which	  are	  not	  more	  or	  less	  inconven-­‐ient	  and	  unpleasant,”	  George	  Washington	  called	  “for	  a	  spirit	  of	  acquiescence	  in	  the	  measures	   for	  obtaining	  revenue,	  which	   the	  public	  exigencies	  may	  at	  any	   time	  dic-­‐tate.”22	  The	  remaining	  “myths”	  are	  less	  ideologically	  fundamental,	  but,	  in	  many	  ways,	  just	  as	  important	  insofar	  as	  they	  have	  contributed	  to	  distorted	  understanding	  of	  our	  past	  and,	  therefore,	  our	  constitutional	  present.	  Were,	  for	  example,	  the	  Framers	  “im-­‐partial	  statesmen,	  above	  interest-­‐drive	  politics”?23	  Again,	  there	  is	  a	  “kernel	  of	  truth”	  to	  the	  statement	  by	  Thomas	  Jefferson	  to	  John	  Adams	  that	  the	  persons	  who	  drafted	  the	  Constitution	  were	  unusually	  able	  and	  public-­‐spirited,	  perhaps	  even	  “an	  assem-­‐bly	  of	  demigods.”24	  But	  the	  “gods”	  we	  should	  compare	  them	  to	  are	  those	  found,	  say,	  in	  The	   Iliad,	   capable	   of	   both	   grandiosity	   and	   remarkable	  pettiness	  with	   regard	   to	  protecting	   their	   specific	  domains.	  The	   two	  major	  compromises,	   after	  all,	  were	  en-­‐tirely	  driven	  by	  interest-­‐group	  politics.	  This	  is	  surely	  the	  case	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  felt	  necessity	  to	  accommodate	  slaveowners.	  But	  it	  captures	  as	  well	  Delaware’s	  threat	  to	  
                                                            	   18.	  	   Id.	  at	  15	  (citations	  omitted).	  	  	  	   19.	  	   RAPHAEL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  15.	  	   20.	  	   Compañía	   General	   de	   Tabacos	   de	   Filipinas	   v.	   Collector	   of	   Internal	   Revenue,	   275	   U.S.	   87,	   100	  (1927)	  (Holmes,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  The	  entire	  quotation	  is	  as	  follows:	  	  It	  is	  true	  .	  .	  .	  that	  every	  exaction	  of	  money	  for	  an	  act	  is	  a	  discouragement	  to	  the	  ex-­‐tent	  of	  the	  payment	  required,	  but	  that	  which	  in	  its	  immediacy	  is	  a	  discouragement	  may	   be	   part	   of	   an	   encouragement	   when	   seen	   in	   its	   organic	   connection	   with	   the	  whole.	  Taxes	  are	  what	  we	  pay	  for	  civilized	  society,	  including	  the	  chance	  to	  insure.	  	  Id.	  	   21.	  	   RAPHAEL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  34	  (citation	  omitted).	  	   22.	  	   Id.	  (citation	  omitted).	  	   23.	  	   Id.	  at	  35.	  	   24.	  	   Id.	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torpedo	  the	  entire	  project	  of	  constitutional	  reform	  if	  delegates	  from	  large	  states—and	   all	   states	   were	   larger	   than	   Delaware—did	   not	   submit	   to	   its	   extortionate	   de-­‐mand	  for	  equal	  voting	  power	  in	  the	  Senate.	  Perhaps	  Delaware	  could	  not	  have	  suc-­‐ceeded	  on	  its	  own	  since	  it	  is	  important	  that	  the	  extortion	  was	  demanded	  as	  well	  by	  New	   Jersey	   and	   Connecticut,	   among	   other	   states.	   Although	   tempted	   to	   reject	   the	  demand,	   James	   Madison	   ultimately	   acquiesced,	   but	   only	   because	   the	   alternative	  was	  a	  failed	  convention.25	  In	  Federalist	  No.	  62,	  he	  described	  equal	  voting	  power	  as	  a	  “lesser	  evil,”	  the	  greater	  evil	  being	  no	  constitution	  at	  all.26	  This	  scarcely	  represents	  a	  ringing	   endorsement,	   especially	   since	   those	   unhappy	   with	   the	   other	   “great	   com-­‐promise”	  and	  its	  collaboration	  with	  slave	  states	  whose	  representation	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  (and,	  therefore,	  the	  electoral	  college)	  would	  be	  enhanced	  by	  the	  three-­‐fifths	  clause,	  offered	  a	  basically	  identical	  argument:	  Give	  us	  what	  we	  demand,	  whether	  or	  not	  you	  think	  it	  is	  just,	  or	  we	  will	  bring	  down	  the	  temple.	  Politics	  does	  indeed	  require	  the	  willingness	  to	  make	  often	  unhappy	  compromises,	  and	  the	  basis,	  almost	  by	  definition,	   is	   far	   less	   “high	  principle”	   than	   the	  belief	   that	  getting	  a	  deal,	  whatever	  the	  cost,	  is	  better	  than	  the	  alternative.	  Thus	  Raphael	  is	  clearly	  correct	  that:	  	  	   Downplaying	   the	   political	   nature	   of	   our	   government’s	   creation	   is	  well	  meant	   but	  misguided.	   It	   creates	   too	  much	   distance	   between	  our	  world	  and	  that	  of	  the	  framers.	  If	  we	  see	  the	  men	  who	  wrote	  the	  Constitution	   as	   above	   politics,	  we	   cannot	   see	   them	   as	  models	   for	  how	  we	  might	  resolve	  our	  differences	  today.27	  	  	  This	  is	  excellent	  advice,	  though	  there	  is	  one	  problem:	  Raphael	  does	  not	  speak	  in	  his	  own	  voice	  about	   the	  actual	  merits	  of	   the	   two	  “great	  compromises.”	   Is	   it	   really	   the	  case	  that	  attaining	  a	  new	  constitution	  to	  replace	  the	  Articles	  of	  Confederation	  was	  “worth	  any	  price?”28	  Perhaps	  we	  are	  willing	   to	   give	  Madison	  and	  his	   colleagues	   a	  pass	  on	  the	  Senate,	  even	  if	  we	  agree	  with	  those	  who	  believe	  that	  that	  institution	  has	  been,	  over	  our	  history,	  more	  of	  a	  bane	  than	  a	  boon.29	  But	   is	  this	  true	  of	  slavery	  as	  well?	  Is	  it	  a	  “myth,”	  for	  example,	  to	  suggest	  that	  some	  prices	  are	  not	  worth	  paying?	  	  Might	  we	  not	  have	  been	  better	  off	  without	  the	  Constitution,	  even	  if	  that	  had	  led	  to	  the	   creation	   of	   two	   or	   three	   independent	   countries	   instead	   of	   the	   one	   “United	  States”	  (at	  least	  until	  1861)?30	  It	  is,	  perhaps,	  unfair	  to	  be	  critical	  of	  Raphael	  for	  not	  jumping	   into	   such	  potentially	  bottomless	   lakes	  of	  philosophy	  and	  political	   theory,	  but	   no	   discussion	   of	   “politics”	   and	   attendant	   “compromise”	   can	   truly	   avoid	   them	  forever.	  So	  is	  it	  possible	  that	  those	  who	  refused	  to	  compromise	  and,	  indeed,	  refused	  to	  sign	  the	  proposed	  Constitution	  on	  September	  17,	  1787,	  or	  led	  the	  fight	  thereafter	  to	  reject	  its	  adoption,	  are	  as	  appropriate	  potential	  “models”	  for	  our	  polity	  today	  as	  
                                                            	   25.	  	   Id.	  at	  83-­‐84.	  	  	   26.	  	   THE	  FEDERALIST	  NO.	  62	  (James	  Madison).	  	   27.	  	   RAPHAEL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  55.	  	   28.	  	   See	  LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  33-­‐53.	  	  	   29.	  	   See,	  e.g.,	  LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  6,	  at	  49-­‐62.	  	  	  	  	  	  30.	  	  	  Id.	  at	  13-­‐14.	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those	  who	  swallowed	  their	  doubts,	  whether	  about	  the	  Senate	  or	  about	  slavery,	  and	  counseled	  ratification?	  Chapter	  Five	  moves	  on	   to	   the	  myth	   that	   “James	  Madison	   sired	   the	  Constitu-­‐tion.”31	  Even	  if	  one	  concedes	  the	  premise	  that	  he	  was	  the	  single	  most	  important	  per-­‐son	  at	  Philadelphia,	  not	   least,	  of	  course,	  because	  he	  kept	  such	  good	  notes,	   there	   is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  “sired”	  the	  Constitution	  or,	  even	  more	  to	  the	  point,	  that	  he	  gave	  the	  Constitution	  the	  unconditional	  love	  that	  one	  expects	  from	  parents.	  Mad-­‐ison,	  after	  all,	  was	  decidedly	  unhappy	  with	  certain	  features	  of	  what	  emerged	  from	  Philadelphia.	  I	  have	  already	  mentioned	  his	  description	  of	  the	  Senate	  only	  as	  a	  “less-­‐er	  evil.”32	  Even	  more	  serious	  was	  the	  refusal	  of	  his	  fellow	  delegates,	  after	  repeated	  attempts,	   to	  authorize	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  power	  by	  Congress	   to	   “negative	   in	  all	   cases	  
whatsoever	  [Madison’s	  emphasis]	  on	  the	  legislative	  acts	  of	  the	  States,	  as	  heretofore	  exercised	  by	  the	  Kingly	  prerogative	  .	  .	  .	  .	  Without	  this	  defensive	  power,”	  Madison	  in-­‐sisted,	   “every	  positive	  power	   that	   can	  be	  given	  on	  paper	  will	  be	  evaded	  [and]	  de-­‐feated.”33	   Raphael	   tellingly	   quotes	   the	   eminent	   historian	   Jack	   Rakove,	  who	  wrote	  that	  Madison	  “viewed	  all	  the	  decisions	  that	  had	  diluted	  his	  system	  not	  as	  necessary	  compromises	  but	  as	  fundamental	  errors	  in	  judgment.”34	  To	  many	   students,	  Madison	  may	   be	   best	   known	   as	   one	   of	   the	   co-­‐authors	   of	  
The	  Federalist,	  the	  most	  famous	  defense	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  That	  naturally	  leads	  to	  the	   sixth	   “myth”:	   “The	   Federalist	   Papers	   tell	   us	   what	   the	   Constitution	   really	  means.”35	  Whatever	  one	  may	  think	  of	  The	  Federalist—Raphael	  emphasizes	  that	  they	  become	  denominated	  The	  Federalist	  Papers	  only	  in	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century36—it	  is	  obvious	  to	  any	  well-­‐read	  historian	  that	  they	  in	  no	  serious	  way	  describe	  even	  the	  views	  articulated	  by	  Madison	  and	  Hamilton	  in	  Philadelphia,	  let	  alone	  the	  collective	  understandings	  of	  delegates	  from	  New	  Hampshire	  to	  Georgia,	  who	  presented	  often	  glaringly	   different	   interpretations	   at	   the	   various	   ratification	   constitutions	   that	   in	  fact	   breathed	   the	   proposals	   emanating	   from	   Philadelphia	   into	   juridical	   life.37	   No	  doubt	  many,	  probably	  most,	   readers	  of	  Constitutional	  Myths	  will	   scarcely	  count	  as	  “well-­‐read	  historians,”	  and	  this	  chapter,	  like	  the	  one	  on	  Madison’s	  status	  as	  “sire”	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  will	  undoubtedly	  be	  especially	  valuable	  for	  its	  readers.	  Moreover,	  Raphael	  presents	  an	  illuminating	  history	  of	  the	  publication	  history	  of	  The	  Federalist	  during	  the	  ratification	  period	  and	  thereafter,	  which	  only	  underscores	   the	   fact	   that	  extraordinarily	  few	  Americans	  actually	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  read	  the	  essays,	  even	  if	  they	  had	  the	  inclination.	  “Nationally,	  the	  readership	  was	  exceedingly	  small.”38	  Fol-­‐lowing	  The	  Federalist	  No.	  23,	  only	  an	  excerpt	   from	  The	  Federalist	  No.	  38	  was	  pub-­‐lished	  out-­‐of-­‐state	  at	  all,	  and	  that	  sole	  exception	  took	  place	  “in	  the	  Freeman’s	  Oracle,	  
                                                            	   31.	  	  	  RAPHAEL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  77.	  	   32.	  	   THE	  FEDERALIST	  NO.	  62,	  supra	  note	  26.	  	   33.	  	  	  RAPHAEL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  81.	  	  	   34.	  	   Id.	   at	  89	   (quoting	   JACK	  N.	  RAKOVE,	   JAMES	  MADISON	  AND	  THE	  CREATION	  OF	  THE	  AMERICAN	  REPUBLIC	  79	  (2007)).	  	   35.	  	  	  RAPHAEL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  103.	  	   36.	  	  	  	  Id.	  at	  106-­‐07.	  	  	   37.	  	   See	  PAULINE	  MAIER,	  RATIFICATION:	  THE	  PEOPLE	  DEBATE	  THE	  CONSTITUTION,	  1787-­‐1788	  (2010)	  (review-­‐ing	  the	  history	  of	  the	  ratification	  conventions	  in	  each	  of	  the	  thirteen	  states).	  	   38.	  	  	  RAPHAEL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  106.	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published	  in	  Exeter,	  New	  Hampshire.”39	  Even	   if	   one	   believes	   that	  The	   Federalist	   is	   worth	   reading,	   because,	   after	   all,	  Hamilton	   and	   Madison	   (as	   well	   as	   John	   Jay)	   were	   unusually	   able	   people	   whose	  thoughts	  are	  full	  of	  wisdom,	  Raphael	  notes	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  we	  must	  explain	  why	  it	  is	  the	  particular	  Hamilton	  and	  Madison	  writing	  in	  late	  1787-­‐1788	  who	  are	  so	  reliable	   as	   guides	   to	  wise	   government.40	   “[I]f	  Hamilton	  was	   indeed	  wise	   and	  bril-­‐liant,	  when	  exactly	  was	  that	  so?	  When	  he	  penned	  his	  essays	  as	  Publius	  or	  when	  he	  was	   touting	   a	   stronger,	   more	   centralized	   government	   both	   before	   and	   after	   that	  time?”41	  
The	   Federalist	   No.	   84	   is	   noteworthy,	   among	   other	   reasons,	   for	   its	   argument	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  Bill	  of	  Rights	  is	  not	  only	  not	  a	  defect	  of	  the	  Philadelphia	  draft	  being	  supported	  by	  Publius,	  but	  may	   in	   fact	  be	  a	  genuine	  virtue,	   for	   it	  only	  underscores	  the	  theme	  that	   that	  draft	  establishes	  only	  a	   limited	  national	  government.	  Since	  no	  power	  is	  granted,	  say,	  to	  limit	  the	  press,	  then	  it	  is	  simply	  a	  mistake	  to	  assume	  that	  Congress	   could	   do	   so	   through	   an	   expansive	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Necessary	   and	  Proper	  Clause.42	  This	  may	  be	  Exhibit	  A	  for	  why	  one	  should	  not	  place	  unlimited	  trust	  in	  Publius	  either	  as	  constitutional	   interpreter	  or	  as	  a	  wise	  constitutional	  designer.	  But	  it	  also	  leads	  to	  Raphael’s	  next	  “myth”:	  “The	  Founding	  Fathers	  gave	  us	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights.”43	  Hamilton	  would	   not	   have	   needed	   to	   pen	  The	   Federalist	  No.	   84	   had	   that	  been	   the	   case.	   Instead,	   as	   most	   informed	   readers	   presumably	   know,	   the	   Bill	   of	  Rights	  came	  after	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Framers	  in	  Philadelphia	  and,	  especially	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Madison,	  it	  required	  a	  profound	  change	  of	  mind,	  provoked	  both	  by	  principle	  and	  by	  Madison’s	  understandable	  desire	  to	  enhance	  his	  chances	  with	  pro-­‐Bill	  of	  Rights	  constituents	  in	  a	  close	  race	  against	  James	  Monroe	  for	  a	  seat	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Repre-­‐sentatives.	  Raphael	  makes	  the	  enormously	  important	  point	  that	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights,	  what-­‐ever	   one	   thinks	   about	   what	   might	   be	   termed	   its	   “legal	   necessity”	   or	   substantive	  wisdom,	  was	  designed	  to	  distract	  attention	  from	  much	  more	  fundamental	  critiques	  of	  the	  Constitution	  offered	  by	  persons	  suspicious	  of	  the	  far	  more	  powerful	  national	  government	  it	  was	  designed	  to	  create	  (return	  to	  myths	  one	  and	  four).44	  After	  all,	  the	  remarkably	  close	  thirty	  to	  twenty-­‐seven	  vote	  for	  ratification	  of	  the	  Constitution	  in	  New	  York	  was	  probably	  influenced	  by	  the	  agreement	  to	  ask	  Congress	  to	  call	  a	  new	  Convention,	  as	  allowed	  by	  Article	  V,	  to	  rectify	  what	  were	  deemed	  the	  serious	  prob-­‐lems.	  Needless	   to	  say,	  such	  hopes	  were	  dashed,	  not	   least	  by	  Madison.	  Raphael	  de-­‐scribes	  him	  as	  realizing	  that	  “[t]he	  best	  defense	  [against	  unacceptable	  changes]	  was	  a	  good	  offense.”45	  Congress	  needed	  to	  seize	  the	  initiative	  and	  therefore	  render	  un-­‐
                                                            	   39.	  	  	  Id.	  at	  111.	  	   40.	  	   Id.	  at	  125-­‐26.	  	   41.	  	  	  Id.	  at	  125.	  	  	   42.	  	   See	  U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I,	  §	  8,	  cl.	  18.	  The	  Necessary	  and	  Proper	  clause	  states:	  “To	  make	  all	  Laws	  which	  shall	  be	  necessary	  and	  proper	   for	   carrying	   into	  Execution	   the	   foregoing	  Powers,	   and	  all	   other	  Powers	  vested	   by	   this	   Constitution	   in	   the	   Government	   of	   the	   United	   States,	   or	   in	   any	   Department	   or	   Officer	  thereof.”	  	   43.	  	  	  RAPHAEL,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  131.	  	   44.	  	   See	  id.	  at	  131-­‐51.	  	   45.	  	  	  Id.	  at	  142.	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necessary—or,	  more	   to	   the	  point,	   diminish	   support	   for—a	  new	  convention.	   “Con-­‐gress	  could	  then	  pick	  and	  choose	  amendments	  that	  did	  not	  threaten	  the	  basic	  integ-­‐rity	  of	  the	  Constitution—a	  bill	  of	  rights,	  yes;	  a	  weakening	  of	  congressional	  taxation,	  no.	  Despite	  his	  previous	  opposition	  to	  a	  constitutional	  enumeration	  of	  rights,	  Madi-­‐son	   entertained	   and	   then	   embraced	   this	   simple	   political	   calculus.”46	   The	   Bill	   of	  Rights	  was	  remarkably	  unimportant	  for	  its	  first	  century,	  playing	  no	  genuine	  role	  in	  American	  constitutionalism.	  That	  would	  most	  certainly	  have	  not	  been	  true	  had	  any	  of	  the	  basic	  structures,	  including	  the	  ability	  to	  tax,	  been	  modified.	  All	  of	  these	  “myths”	  obviously	  touch	  on	  debates	  over	  the	  “original	  meaning”	  of	  the	   Constitution.	   As	   already	   noted,	   this	   is	   the	   subject	   of	   Raphael’s	   final	   chapter,	  which	   challenges	   the	   “myth”	   that	   “[b]y	   discovering	  what	   the	   framers	   intended	   or	  how	  the	  founding	  generation	  understood	  the	  text,	  we	  can	  determine	  how	  each	  pro-­‐vision	  of	  the	  Constitution	  must	  be	  applied.”47	  I	  have	  no	  difficulty	  at	  all	  agreeing	  with	  him.	  Originalism,	  especially	  as	  defined	  by	  proponents	  like	  Justices	  Scalia	  and	  Thom-­‐as	  (in	  contrast,	  say,	  to	  Jack	  Balkin’s	  innovative	  arguments	  in	  Living	  Originalism),48	  is,	  I	  think,	  basically	  foolish.	  It	  relies	  on:	  a)	  the	  demonstrably	  wrong	  belief	  that	  the	  his-­‐torical	  materials	   speak	   in	  a	   sufficiently	   clear	  voice	   that	   lets	  us	  know	  exactly	  what	  was	  meant	  with	  regard	  to	  issues	  that	  were	  controversial	  even	  at	  the	  time,	  let	  alone	  in	   our	   own,	   very	   different,	   day;	   b)	   tendentious	   assumptions	   as	   to	   who	   precisely	  count	   as	   “the	   framers”	  whose	   views	   should	   be	   privileged,	   given	   the	   literally	   hun-­‐dreds,	   perhaps	   thousands,	   of	   potential	   candidates	   who	   often	   differed	   amongst	  themselves	  about	  what	  exactly	  had	  been	  done	  in	  Philadelphia;	  and	  then	  c)	  that	  what	  is	  often	  called	  the	  “dead	  hand	  of	  the	  past”	  should	  control	  our	  lives	  today.	  Why?	  Raphael’s	   concluding	   chapter	  might	   be	  useful	   for	   any	   reader	  who	   really	   has	  not	  thought	  much	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other	  about	  methods	  of	  constitutional	  interpreta-­‐tion.	   I	   am	   afraid,	   though,	   that	   for	   everyone	   else,	   it	   will	   prove	   the	   least	   satisfying	  chapter,	  either	  because,	  as	  in	  my	  case,	  it	  simply	  corroborates	  what	  I	  already	  believe,	  or,	   for	   some	  readers,	  because	  he	   rejects	   the	   status	  of	   the	  Constitution	  as	  a	   funda-­‐mental	   “contract”	   among	   the	   citizenry,	  with	   attendant	   duties	   to	   be	   faithful	   to	   the	  meaning	   of	   the	   contract	   and	   to	   change	   it,	   if	   necessary,	   only	   through	   the	   formal	  amendment	  that	  is	  allowed	  by	  Article	  V.	  I	  hope,	  though,	  that	  even	  those	  inclined	  to	  dismiss	  the	  “mythic”	  status	  of	  “originalism”	  will	  read	  and	  learn	  from	  the	  prior	  chap-­‐ters.	  
Anthony	  King	  on	  the	  “Paradoxes	  of	  American	  Democracy”	  King	  has	  written	  a	  set	  of	  informed	  (and	  very	  interesting)	  meditations	  on	  some	  central	   challenges	   presented	   in	   the	   views	   of	   those	  we	   call	   the	   “founding	   fathers”	  with	  regard	  to	  assumptions	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  make	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  democratic	  rule	  by	  “the	  people.”	  Thus,	  “[t]he	  argument	  of	  this	  book	  is	  that	  the	  political	  system	  of	  the	  United	  States	  is	  now,	  and	  has	  been	  for	  many	  dec-­‐ades,	  based	  on	  two	  antithetical	  principles—principles	  that	  not	  only	  differ	  from	  each	  
                                                            	   46.	  	  	  Id.	  	   47.	  	  	  Id.	  at	  153.	  	  	   48.	  	   See	  generally	  JACK	  M.	  BALKIN,	  LIVING	  ORIGINALISM	  (2011).	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other	  but	   actually	   come	   into	   conflict	  with	   each	  other	   at	   almost	   every	  point.”49	  On	  one	   hand,	   “the	   founding	   fathers’	   conception	   of	   ‘constitutional’	   government”	   is	  “characterized	  by	  a	  separation	  of	  powers	  and	  containing	  provisions	  for	  a	  wide	  vari-­‐ety	  of	  checks	  and	  balances.”50	  But	  that	  is	  countered	  by	  what	  King	  terms	  as	  “‘radical	  democracy,’	   the	   idea	   that	   in	   a	   true	   democracy	   the	   people	   and	   only	   the	   people	  should	  rule	  and	  that	  their	  preferences	  and	  their	  preferences	  alone	  should	  under	  all	  circumstances	   be	   decisive.”51	  He	   terms	   these	   the	   two	   “tectonic	   plates”52	   that	   con-­‐tend	  with	  one	  another	  within	  the	  American	  political	  system.53	  One	  might	  think	  that	  their	  conflict	  would	  occasion	  frequent	  political	  earthquakes;	  what	  may	  be	  most	  no-­‐table	  about	  American	  politics	  is	  their	  infrequency.	  King	  offers	  a	  series	  of	  “puzzles”	  that	  demand	  explanation.54	  The	  first	  is	  some-­‐thing	  that	  we	  probably	  almost	  never	  think	  about:	  “the	  gross	  restrictions	  placed	  on	  the	  sorts	  of	  people	  eligible	  to	  become	  president	  of	  the	  United	  States.”55	  He	  is	  refer-­‐ring	  not	  only	  to	  the	  well-­‐known	  exclusion	  of	  all	  non-­‐“natural	  born	  citizens”	  from	  the	  presidency,	   but	   also	   to	   the	   requirement	   that	   the	   president	   be	   at	   least	   thirty-­‐five	  years	  old.56	  As	  he	  notes,	  many	  political	  systems	  allow	  anyone	  legally	  entitled	  to	  vote	  to	   occupy	   any	   given	   political	   office,	   subject	   to	   the	   decision	   of	   the	   voters	   them-­‐selves.57	  Americans	  drafting	  the	  Constitution	  in	  1787	  were	  obviously	  familiar	  with	  the	   fact	   that	  William	   Pitt,	   the	   younger,	   had	   become	   prime	  minister	   at	   the	   age	   of	  twenty-­‐four!58	  One	  cannot	  tax	  the	  framers	  with	  knowledge	  of	  what	  would	  come	  lat-­‐er	   in	   the	  nineteenth	  or	   twentieth	  centuries,	  but	  King	  notes	   that	   the	   “legal	  gap	  be-­‐tween	   the	   voting	   age	   and	   the	   age	   of	   eligibility	   for	   the	   highest	   office	  .	  .	  .	   is	   usually	  quite	  narrow”	  where	  it	  exists	  at	  all—“for	  instance,	  three	  years	  in	  Australia,	  Belgium,	  Ireland	   and	  Luxembourg	   and	  only	   two	   in	  Austria.”59	  King	   goes	   on	   to	   suggest	   that	  approximately	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  citizenry	  is	  rendered	  ineligible	  to	  become	  president	  because	  of	  the	  various	  exclusionary	  rules.60	  He	  describes	  this	  as	  a	  “huge	  discrepan-­‐cy”	  that	  “is	  far	  greater	  than	  in	  any	  other	  democratic	  country.”61	  And,	  of	  course,	  the	  Twenty-­‐second	   Amendment	   presents	   another	   important	   limit	   on	   the	   ability	   of	  Americans	   to	  make	   an	   unconstrained	   choice	   as	   to	  who	   should	   lead	   them.62	   From	  
                                                            	   49.	  	  	  KING,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  2.	  	   50.	  	  	  Id.	  at	  3.	  	   51.	  	  	  Id.	  	  	   52.	  	   Id.	  at	  130.	  	   53.	  	   Id.	  at	  130-­‐53.	  	   54.	  	   Id.	  at	  1-­‐15.	  	   55.	  	  	  Id.	  at	  3.	  	   56.	  	   Id.	  at	  4.	  	   57.	  	   Id.	  at	  3.	  	   58.	  	   See	  id.	  	   59.	  	  	  Id.	  	   60.	  	   Id.	  at	  5.	  	   61.	  	  	  Id.	  	   62.	  	   The	  Twenty-­‐second	  Amendment	  states,	  in	  part:	  
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person 
who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a 
term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of 
the President more than once. U.S.	  CONST.	  amend.	  XXII,	  §	  1.	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one	   perspective,	   of	   course,	   this	   affects	   only	   the	   three	   currently	   living	   Americans	  (Bill	  Clinton,	  George	  W.	  Bush,	  and	  Barack	  Obama)	  who	  will	  be	  prevented	  from	  re-­‐turning	  to	  the	  Oval	  Office	  in	  2017;	  from	  another,	  it	  affects	  each	  and	  every	  one	  of	  us	  within	  the	  American	  polity	   inasmuch	  as	  we	  might	  think	  that	  the	  country	  would	   in	  fact	  benefit	  from	  that	  return.	  One	  might	   regard	   this	   “puzzle”	   as	   quite	   academic,	   perhaps	   in	   the	   pejorative	  sense.	   After	   all,	   it	   perhaps	   underscores	  King’s	   sense	   of	  what	   is	   strange	   about	   the	  American	  polity	  to	  note	  that	  there	  is	  no	  social	  or	  political	  movement	  committed	  to	  changing	   these	   clear	   constraints	   on	   democratic	   choice	   by	   eliminating	   the	   age	   re-­‐strictions	   or	   even	   making	   naturalized	   citizens	   eligible	   for	   the	   presidency.63	   Nor,	  even	  (or	  especially)	  during	  the	  present	  season	  of	  great	  debate	  about	  American	  im-­‐migration	  policy,	  is	  there	  any	  attempt	  to	  amend	  the	  clauses	  of	  the	  Constitution	  that	  currently	  render	  ineligible	  naturalized	  citizens	  to	  run	  for	  the	  House	  or	  Senate	  until	  seven	   and	   nine	   years,	   respectively,	   following	   their	   joining	   the	   American	   political	  community.64	  I	  have	  argued	  elsewhere	  that	  this	  is	  the	  most	  glaring	  example	  of	  “se-­‐cond-­‐class	   citizenship”	   inscribed	   within	   the	   national	   Constitution.65	   However	   un-­‐democratic	   these	   aspects	   of	   the	  1787	  Constitution	  might	   be,	   they	   simply	   raise	  no	  genuine	  problems	  for	  almost	  all	  Americans	  themselves.	  King’s	   other	   “puzzles”	   are	   considerably	   less	   academic.	   Thus,	   he	   notes	   the	  widespread	  use	  of	  mechanisms	  of	  “direct	  democracy,”	  including	  referenda,	  in	  many	  American	  states.66	  “Referendums,”	  he	  writes,	  “are	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  American	  po-­‐litical	   life.”67	   He	   notes	   that	   in	   2006	   alone,	   “Arizona	   held	   referendums	   relating	   to	  nineteen	   separate	   issues,	   California	   ten,	   Colorado	   fourteen,	   South	   Dakota	   eleven,	  Nevada	   ten,	  Oregon	   ten,	  Rhode	   Island	  nine,	  Georgia	   nine,	   Louisiana	   eight	   and	   an-­‐other	   twenty-­‐eight	   random	  scatterings	  of	  others.	   In	   a	  number	  of	   states,	  mainly	   in	  the	  West,	  government	  by	  referendum	  is	  almost	   the	  norm.”68	  Since	  then,	  of	  course,	  there	  have	  been	  notable	  episodes	  of	  direct	  democracy	  in	  yet	  other	  states	  like	  Maine	  (involving	   same-­‐sex	  marriage	   and	   voting	   rights);69	  Ohio	   (concerning	   the	   rights	   of	  public	  employee	  unions);70	  Minnesota	  (same-­‐sex	  marriage);71	  the	  State	  of	  Washing-­‐ton	   (same-­‐sex	   marriage);72	   Wisconsin	   (attempts	   to	   recall	   governor	   and	   legisla-­‐
                                                            	   63.	  	   Though	   there	   was	   some	   brief	   interest	   in	   amending	   the	   Constitution	   in	   order	   to	   make	   Arnold	  Schwarznegger	  eligible	  to	  run	  for	  the	  presidency	  in	  2008.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Martin	  Kasindorf,	  Should	  the	  Constitu-­‐
tion	   be	   Amended	   for	   Arnold,	   U.S.A.	   TODAY	   (Dec.	   3,	   2004),	  http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/2004-­‐12-­‐02-­‐schwarzenegger-­‐amendment_x.htm.	  	   64.	  	   See	  U.S.	  CONST.	  art.	  I,	  §	  2,	  cl.	  2	  (requiring	  a	  citizen	  to	  live	  in	  the	  United	  States	  for	  seven	  years	  before	  running	  for	  a	  House	  of	  Representatives	  position);	  see	  also	  id.	  art.	  I,	  §	  3,	  cl.	  3	  (stating	  that	  a	  citizen	  must	  live	  in	  the	  United	  States	  for	  nine	  years	  before	  running	  for	  Senator).	  	   65.	    LEVINSON, supra note 6, at 142.	  	   66.	  	   KING,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  7-­‐8.	  	  	  	  	  67.	  	   Id.	  at	  7.	  	  	  	  	  68.	  	   Id.	  	   69.	  	   Ben	   Brumfield,	   Voters	   Approve	   Same-­‐Sex	   Marriage	   for	   the	   First	   Time,	   CNN.COM,	   Nov.	   7,	   2012,	  http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/pol-­‐same-­‐sex-­‐marriage/index.html.	  	   70.	  	   Kris	   Maher	   &	   Jack	   Nicas,	   Ohio	   Voters	   Reject	   Public-­‐Union	   Limits,	   WALL	   ST.	   J.,	   Nov.	   9,	   2011,	  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204190704577026360072268418.html.	  	   71.	  	   Brumfield,	  supra	  note	  69.	  	   72.	  	   Id.	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tors);73	   and	  Massachusetts	   (medical	   marijuana).74	   It	   is	   no	   coincidence,	   of	   course,	  that	  all	  of	   these	  episodes	  occurred	  within	  American	  states.	  The	  national	  Constitu-­‐tion	  was	   drafted	   by	   people	  who	   can	   be	   described	   as	  militantly	   opposed	   to	   direct	  participation	   by	   the	   “We	   the	   People”	   in	   whose	   name	   the	   document	   ostensibly	  spoke.	   James	  Madison	  proudly	  wrote	   in	  The	  Federalist	  No.	  63	  of	   the	  Constitution’s	  “‘total	  exclusion	  of	  the	  people	  in	  their	  collective	  capacity	  from	  any	  share’”	  in	  the	  actu-­‐alities	  of	  governmental	  decision-­‐making.75	  So	  why	  did	  so	  many	  states,	  most	  of	  them,	  as	  King	  notes,	  in	  the	  American	  West,	  adopt	  systems	  of	  direct	  democracy	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century?76	  One	  pos-­‐sibility	  is	  simply	  that	  popular	  conceptions	  of	  “democracy”	  had	  changed	  over	  the	  en-­‐suing	  century	  following	  1787	  and	  that	  what	  Lincoln	  so	  memorably	  called	  “govern-­‐ment	   by	   the	   people,”	   if	   taken	   truly	   seriously,	   was	   recognized	   almost	   logically	   to	  entail	  far	  more	  opportunities	  for	  direct	  participation	  than	  was	  envisioned	  by	  those	  in	  Philadelphia	  (or,	   for	  that	  matter,	  those	  drafting	  state	  constitutions	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century).	  This	  could	  help	  explain	  the	  rise	  not	  only	  of	  referenda	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  “recall”	  public	  officials,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  move	  toward	  elected	  judiciaries	  in	  most	  of	   the	  states.77	  One	  should	  not	  underestimate	   the	  potential	   importance	  of	  pure	  conceptual	  argument,	   though	  what	   then	  has	  to	  be	  explained,	  as	  King	  empha-­‐sizes,	  is	  why	  there	  has	  been	  no	  sustained	  movement	  to	  add	  any	  direct	  democracy	  at	  the	  national	  level	  (or	  to	  expand	  it	  in	  those	  states	  that	  offer	  only	  relatively	  minimal	  forms	  of	  direct	  democracy)	  or	   to	  elect	   federal	   judges.78	  This	  brings	  up	   the	  second	  possible	  explanation,	  which	  relies,	   in	  good	  Holmesian	   fashion,	   less	  on	   “logic”	   than	  on	   “experience.”	   This	  makes	   crucial,	   for	   example,	   the	   felt	   levels	   of	   dissatisfaction	  with	   what	   is	   observed	   to	   be	   taking	   place	   in	   state	   capitols.	   Thus,	   King	   notes	   that	  “state	   legislatures	   in	   the	  U.S.	   toward	   the	   end	  of	   the	  nineteenth	   century	  were	  pre-­‐cisely	  those	  bodies	  that	  populists	  and	  progressives	  held	  in	  the	  greatest	  loathing	  and	  contempt.”79	   There	   was	   a	   powerful	   withdrawal	   of	   legitimacy	   from	   these	   institu-­‐tions,	   reflected	   in	   the	   support	   of	   alternative	   mechanisms	   of	   government	   that	   al-­‐lowed	  “the	  people”	  to	  recapture	  control	  of	  a	  political	  system	  that	  many	  saw	  as	   in-­‐creasingly	  captured	  by	  given	  economic	  interests	  and	  closed	  to	  ordinary	  citizens.	  But	  one	  can	  scarcely	  believe	  that	  contemporary	  Americans	  are	  filled	  with	  love	  and	  admiration	  for	  members	  of	  Congress.	  As	  of	  mid-­‐July	  2013,	   for	  example,	   fewer	  than	  one	  in	  six	  Americans,	  save	  for	  one	  outlier	  poll,	  “approved”	  of	  Congress.80	  Con-­‐comitantly,	  the	  “disapproval”	  rate	  ranged	  from	  a	  “low”	  of	  72	  percent	  to	  a	  high	  of	  83	  
                                                            	   73.	  	   Colleen	  McCain	  Nelson	  &	  Douglas	  Belkin,	  Wisconsin	   Battle	   in	  National	   Eye,	  WALL	   ST.	   J.,	   Apr.	   13,	  2012,	  http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303624004577341953568378704.html.	  	   74.	  	   Alan	   Duke,	  2	   States	   Legalize	   Pot,	   But	   Don’t	   ‘Break	   Out	   the	   Cheetos’	   Yet,	   CNN.COM,	   Nov.	   8,	   2012,	  http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/07/politics/marijuana-­‐legalization/index.html.	  	   75.	  	   LEVINSON,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  51	  (emphasis	  added).	  	   76.	  	   KING,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  158-­‐59.	  	   77.	  	   	  See	  id.	  at	  119-­‐21.	  	   78.	  	   Id.	  at	  120-­‐21.	  	   79.	  	   Id.	  at	  125.	  	   80.	  	   Congressional	  Job	  Approval,	  	  REALCLEARPOLITICS.COM,	  http://realclearpolitics.com/epolls/other/congressional_job_approval-­‐903.html	   (last	   visited	   Sept.	   18,	  2013).	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percent.81	   Since	   then	   the	   national	   government	   shut	   down	   and,	   not	   surprisingly,	  congressional	   approval	   plummeted	   below	  10	   percent.82	   	   Yet	   there	   is	   no	   call	   from	  any	  mass	  movement	  or	  even	  mainstream	  pundits	  or	  political	  leaders	  for	  rethinking	  our	   exclusive	   reliance	   on	   representative	   democracy.	   King	   is	   puzzled	   why	   that	   is	  so.83	  Note	  well	  that	  he	  is	  not	  simply	  asking	  why	  the	  United	  States	  has	  not	  been	  more	  influenced	   by	   conceptions	   of	   democratic	   constitutionalism	   in	   Europe.	   One	   might	  quickly	  respond	  that	  Europe	  has	  nothing	  to	  teach	  the	  United	  States	  because	  we	  are,	  after	  all,	   “exceptional.”	  But	   this	   is	  where	  King’s	  emphasis	  on	  American	  states	   is	  so	  important.	   It	  simply	  makes	  no	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  “Americans	  believe	  only	   in	  repre-­‐sentative	  democracy”	  when	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  practices	  in	  so	  many	  of	  the	  states.	  Per-­‐haps	  one	  might	  argue	  that	  given	  state	  constitutions	  are	  perfect	  for	  those	  states	  and	  that	  the	  United	  States	  Constitution	  is	  perfect	  for	  the	  nation,	  but,	  to	  put	  it	  mildly,	  that	  argument	  has	  not	  really	  been	  made,	  not	   to	  mention	  that	   it	  seems	  on	   its	   face	  to	  be	  wildly	   implausible.	   Instead,	   almost	   all	   analysts	   have	   chosen	   simply	   to	   ignore	   the	  anomaly	  presented	  by	  comparing	  American	  state	  and	  national	  constitutional	  tradi-­‐tions.84	  King	  offers	  other	  “puzzles”	  that	  exemplify	  his	  basic	  question	  about	  the	  limits	  of	  democracy	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Why,	  almost	  uniquely,	  is	  abortion	  thought	  to	  be	  a	  question	   to	   be	   decided	   by	   (unelected)	   judges	   instead	   of	   by	   legislators,	   as	   is	   true	  throughout	  Europe?85	  He	  concludes	  his	  introduction	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  paradox	  that	  candidates	  for	  the	  presidency	  (and	  many	  other	  offices	  as	  well)	  are	  chosen	  in	  bitterly	  contested	   primaries,	   a	   phenomenon	   seen	   in	   few	   other	   countries,	   but	   then	   presi-­‐dents	   themselves	   are	   finally	   selected	   through	   a	   truly	   byzantine	   process,	   i.e.,	   the	  electoral	  college,	  which	  in	  many	  ways	  makes	  a	  travesty	  of	  democracy.86	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  book	  offers	  certain	  answers	  to	  these	  (and	  other)	  puzzles.87	  But	  the	   basic	   answer	   has	   to	   do	  with	   the	   fact,	   as	   already	   suggested,	   that	   the	   Framers	  simply	  did	  not	  share	  Lincoln’s	  professed	  faith	  in	  government	  by	  the	  people.88	  King	  grants	  the	  proposition	  that	  the	  “1787	  Constitution	  was,	  by	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  con-­‐temporary	   civilized	  world,	  many	   decades	   ahead	   of	   its	   time”89	   in	   rejecting	   rule	   by	  monarchs	  or	  other	  aristocrats	  and	  otherwise	  moving	  toward	  what	  we	  might	  recog-­‐nize	  as	  democracy—a	  word,	  incidentally,	  rarely	  used	  favorably	  by	  people	  of	  the	  era.	  
                                                            	   81.	  	   Id.	  	   82.	  	   Id.	  (last	  visited	  on	  Nov.	  6,	  2013).	  	   83.	  	   KING,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  177-­‐78.	  	   84.	  	   See	  the	  very	  important	  JOHN	  J.	  DINAN,	  THE	  AMERICAN	  STATE	  CONSTITUTIONAL	  TRADITION	  (2007)	  for	  “a	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  the	  extant	  state	  convention	  debates”	  and	  discussion	  of:	  [T]he	  extent	   to	  which	   state	   conventions	  have	  addressed	   fundamental	  questions	  of	  the	  kind	  that	  were	  treated	  in	  the	  federal	  convention	  .	  .	  .	  state	  conventions	  have	  been	  a	  forum	  for	  reconsidering,	  and	  ultimately	  revising	  or	  rejecting,	  a	  number	  of	  govern-­‐ing	  principles	  and	  institutions	  that	  were	  adopted	  by	  the	  federal	  convention	  of	  1787	  and	  that	  have	  remained	  relatively	  unchanged	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  
Id.	  at	  3.	  	   85.	  	   KING,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  9.	  	   86.	  	   Id.	  at	  9-­‐13.	  	   87.	  	   See	  generally	  id.	  	   88.	  	   Id.	  	   89.	  	   Id.	  at	  62.	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“But,	  simultaneously,	  it	  was	  far	  from	  creating	  arrangements	  in	  which	  the	  people	  at	  large	  were	  to	  be	  either	  the	  sole	  or	  the	  dominant	  political	  power.	  The	  people	  were	  given	  a	  place,	  to	  be	  sure,	  but	  they	  were	  also	  to	  be	  kept	  in	  that	  place.”90	  Subsequent	  American	  history,	  to	  a	  significant	  extent,	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  efforts	  of	  many	  different	  people(s),	  often	  denounced	  as	  “uppity”	  or	  otherwise	  unwilling	  to	  accept	  their	  place	  in	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  hierarchical	  social	  order,	  to	  move	  toward	  center	  stage	  in	  Ameri-­‐can	  politics.	  Thus,	   the	   tectonic	  plates	  clashed	  with	  one	  another.	  Still,	   “a	   large	  pro-­‐portion	  of	  what	  the	  founding	  fathers	  drafted	  and	  signed	  in	  1787	  more	  than	  two	  cen-­‐turies	  later	  survives	  as	  an	  abiding	  and	  dominant	  political	  presence.”91	  King	  expresses	  more	  than	  puzzlement;	  his	  final	  chapter,	  “Democracy	  in	  Amer-­‐ica,”	  presents	  “a	   few	  foreigner’s	  reflections	  on	   the	  U.S.	   system,	  reflections	   that	  are	  prompted	  in	  most	  cases	  by	  the	  grinding,	  creaking	  and	  groaning	  of	  our	  two	  tectonic	  plates.”92	  He	  does	  not	  hesitate	  to	  describe	  some	  aspects	  of	  “America’s	  present	  [po-­‐litical]	  arrangements	  .	  .	  .	  as	  being,	  at	  best,	  unfortunate	  and,	  at	  worst,	  outrageous.”93	  Among	  these	  is	  the	  role	  played	  by	  money	  in	  our	  politics,	  which,	  he	  writes,	  “strikes	  foreigners	  as	  obscene,”94	  though	  he	  notes	  as	  well	  that	  most	  Americans,	  responding	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  polls,	  have	  also	  registered	  their	  dismay	  about	  such	  decisions	  as	  Citi-­‐
zens	  United	   v.	   Federal	  Election	  Commission.95	  He	   returns	  once	  more	   to	  his	   general	  animus	  against	  the	  various	  restrictions	  placed	  on	  participation	  in	  the	  electoral	  sys-­‐tem,	  which,	  he	  writes,	   “strike[]	  a	   foreigner	  .	  .	  .	  as	  being	  not	  only	   indefensible	  but	  a	  gross	   violation	   of	   the	   most	   elementary	   democratic	   principles.”96	   And,	   noting	   the	  sheer	   difficulty	   placed	   in	   the	   way	   of	   amendment	   by	   Article	   V,	   he	   suggests	   that	  “Americans	  might	   at	   least	  want	   to	   consider	  whether	   the	   present	  mechanisms	   for	  amending	   the	  American	  Constitution	  are	  any	   longer,	   in	  a	   fully-­‐fledged	  democracy,	  the	  appropriate	  ones.”97	  All	  of	   this	  being	  said,	  King	  offers	  what	  may	  be	  a	   rueful	   recognition	   that	   “the	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  Americans	  .	  .	  .	  are	  nevertheless	  reasonably	  content	  with	  the	   system	  as	   a	  whole.”98	  That	   is	   a	   statement	  of	   empirical	   fact.99	   Somewhat	  more	  questionable	  is	  his	  conclusion	  that	  “[t]he	  delicate	  balance	  that	  exists	  at	  present	  be-­‐tween	  these	  two	  bodies	  of	  doctrine	  may	  not	  give	  everyone	  total	  satisfaction,	  but	  se-­‐rious	  efforts	  to	  disturb	  the	  existing	  balance	  could,	  in	  themselves,	  prove	  disturbing,	  quite	  possibly	  dangerously	  so.”100	  Indeed,	  the	  book	  ends	  by	  suggesting	  that:	  	   [T]he	  U.S.	  Constitution	  serves	  as	  one	  of	  America’s	  few	  effective	  uni-­‐fiers.	  It	  brings	  together	  what	  might	  otherwise	  fall	  or	  fly	  apart.	  It	  is	  
                                                            	   90.	  	   Id.	  at	  62.	  	   91.	  	   Id.	  at	  68.	  	   92.	  	   Id.	  at	  177.	  	   93.	  	   Id.	  at	  194.	  	   94.	  	   Id.	  at	  195.	  	   95.	  	   Id.	  at	  195-­‐96;	  see	  Citizens	  United	  v.	  Fed.	  Election	  Comm’n,	  588	  U.S.	  310	  (2010).	  	  	   96.	  	   KING,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  198.	  	   97.	  	   Id.	  at	  203.	  	   98.	  	   Id.	  at	  204.	  	   99.	  	   Id.	  	   100.	  	  	  Id.	  at	  206.	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an	  object	  of	  worship	  because	  Americans	  badly	  need	  a	  solid	  core	  of	  institutions	  and	  objects	  which	   they	  all	   feel	   that	   they	   can	  worship	  together.	  As	  the	  man	  said	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Constitution,	  “It’s	  what	  holds	  us	  all	  together.”101	  	  This	  conclusion	  is	  congruent	  with	  an	  earlier	  comment,	  that	  “[a]fter	  more	  than	  two	   hundred	   years,	   no	   one	   could	   plausibly	   maintain	   that,	   on	   any	   criterion,	   the	  American	  system	  has	  been	  a	   flop.”102	  Well,	   I	  suppose	   it	  all	  depends,	  as	  Bill	  Clinton	  might	  have	  put	  it,	  what	  the	  meaning	  of	  “flop”	  is.	  Does	  it	  count	  against	  “the	  American	  system”	   that	   within	   seventy-­‐five	   years	   it	   generated	   a	   remarkably	   savage	   conflict	  that	  took,	  we	  now	  know,	  at	  least	  750,000	  lives?103	  Does	  it	  count	  against	  the	  system	  that	  by	  a	  number	  of	  criteria,	  ranging	  from	  quality	  of	  education	  to	  infant	  mortality	  to	  the	  prospects	   for	   social	  mobility	  by	   someone	  born	  outside	  of	  America’s	   economic	  elites,	   the	   United	   States	   is	   falling	   steadily	   behind	   many	   other	   nations	   in	   the	  world?104	  Ironically,	  what	  is	  missing	  in	  this	  generally	  worthwhile	  and	  interesting	  book	  is	  analysis	  of	  the	  empirical	  connections	  between	  democratic	  (or	  undemocratic)	  modes	  of	  decision-­‐making	  and	  the	  substantive	  decisions	  themselves.	  Modes	  concern	  inputs	  into	   the	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  which	  are	  very	  well	   identified	  and	   criticized	  by	  King,	  but	  most	  members	  of	  the	  political	  order,	  I	  think,	  are	  most	  concerned	  with	  the	  actual	   decisional	   outputs	   of	   the	   system.	   Perhaps	   the	   role	   played	   by	  money	   is	   ob-­‐scene,	  but	  that	  may,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  be	  an	  aesthetic	  judgment,	  similar	  to	  criti-­‐cizing	  Americans	  for	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  we	  spend	  on	  athletic	  events	  or	  pet	  food	  (or,	  for	  that	  matter,	  spend	  on	  individual	  works	  of	  art	  instead	  of	  donating	  those	  mil-­‐lions	  of	  dollars	  to	  a	  worthwhile	  charity).	  Only	  if	  money	  genuinely	  distorts	  the	  out-­‐comes	  of	  American	  politics	  in	  a	  negative	  way	  can	  it	  be	  said	  to	  be	  worth	  anguishing	  over.	  The	  point	  is	  obvious	  with	  regard,	  say,	  to	  Arnold	  Schwarzenegger’s	  ineligibility	  to	   become	  president	   because	   he	  was	   born	   in	  Austria.	   I	   easily	   agree	   that	   that	   is	   a	  morally	  indefensible	  feature	  of	  the	  1787	  Constitution,	  and	  I	  wish	  the	  proposals	  ear-­‐ly	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century	  to	  amend	  the	  Constitution	  had	  succeeded.	  But	  can	  any	  serious	   person	   believe	   that	   he	  was	   “indispensable”	   to	   our	   national	   flourishing	   or	  even	  that	  his	  election,	  had	  it	  been	  permitted,	  would	  have	  been	  a	  net	  plus	  instead	  of	  possibly	  a	  disastrous	  minus?	  That	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  Constitution	  is	  “undemocratic”—even	  “indefensible”	  on	  sound	  theoretical	  terms—does	  not	  necessarily	  make	  it	  very	  important	  to	  most	  people	  whose	  primary	  interest	  is	  not	  political	  theory.	  I	  was	  led	  to	  this	  conclusion	  by	  the	  response	  to	  one	  of	  my	  own	  earlier	  books,	  
Our	   Undemocratic	   Constitution:	  Where	   the	   Constitution	   Goes	  Wrong	   (And	   How	  We	  
                                                            	   101.	  	   Id.	  at	  207.	  	   102.	  	   Id.	  at	  178.	  	   103.	  	   Guy	   Gugliotta,	   New	   Estimate	   Raises	   Civil	   War	   Death	   Toll,	   N.Y.	   TIMES,	   Apr.	   2,	   2012,	  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/science/civil-­‐war-­‐toll-­‐up-­‐by-­‐20-­‐percent-­‐in-­‐new-­‐estimate.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.	  	   104.	  	   Howard	   Friedman,	   How	   to	   Make	   America	   Great	   Again:	   New	   Book,	   CNBC,	   June	   27,	   2012,	  http://www.cnbc.com/id/47968003.	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the	  People	  Can	  Correct	  It).105	  King	  discusses	  the	  book,	  which	  calls	  for	  a	  new	  constitu-­‐tional	  convention	  to	  ameliorate	  the	  undemocratic	  defects	  I	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Constitu-­‐tion,	  but	  he	  writes	  as	  well	   that	   “[t]alk	  of	  major	  constitutional	  change	   in	   the	  U.S.	   is	  largely	  confined	  to	  the	  kinds	  of	  people	  whom	  the	  British	  dismiss	  as	  ‘the	  chattering	  classes’—university	  professors,	  journalists,	  pamphleteers,	  bloggers	  and	  cranks.”106	  I	  might	  well	  be	  viewed	  as	  fitting	  three	  of	  these	  categories:	  I	  teach	  at	  a	  major	  universi-­‐ty,	   I	  blog	   frequently	  on	  Balkinization,	  and	  I	  have	  described	  myself	  as	  a	   “crank”	   in-­‐asmuch	   as	   I	   increasingly	   do	   believe	   that	   the	   Constitution	   constitutes	   a	   clear	   and	  present	  danger	  to	  our	  ability	  to	  flourish—or	  perhaps	  even	  to	  survive—as	  a	  truly	  ef-­‐fective	  political	  system.	  Thus	  the	  subtitle	  of	  my	  successor	  book	  focused	  far	  less	  on	  the	  “undemocratic”	  features	  of	  the	  Constitution—who	  really	  cares?—than	  about	  the	  “crisis	  of	  governance”	  the	  country	  increasingly	  faces	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  outputs	  that,	  for	  most	  people,	  determine	  legitimacy	  or	  the	  basis	  of	  satisfaction	  in	  any	  given	  polit-­‐ical	   order.	   A	   banner	   event	   in	   2011	   was	   the	   downgrading	   of	   American	   bonds	   by	  Standard	  &	  Poor’s	  from	  AAA	  to	  AA	  status,	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  bitter	  conflict	  between	  Republicans	   in	  Congress	  and	  President	  Obama	  over	   increasing	   the	   legal	  debt	   lim-­‐it.107	  “The	  downgrade	  reflects,”	  said	  Standard	  &	  Poor’s,	  “our	  view	  that	  the	  effective-­‐ness,	   stability,	   and	   predictability	   of	   American	   policymaking	   and	   political	   institu-­‐tions	  have	  weakened	  at	  a	   time	  of	  ongoing	   fiscal	   and	  economic	   challenges.”108	  One	  wonders	   if	   those	  charged	  with	  assessing	  the	  “effectiveness,	  stability,	  and	  predicta-­‐bility”	   of	   American	   political	   behavior	   could	   possibly	   have	   been	   heartened	   by	   the	  most	  recent	  “debt	  crisis”	  in	  October	  2013,	  where	  default	  was	  avoided	  almost	  literal-­‐ly	  at	  the	  last	  minute.	  And,	  of	  course,	  the	  government	  did	  shut	  down	  because	  of	  the	  refusal	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  to	  fund	  basic	  national	  programs	  in	  the	  ab-­‐sence	  of	  a	  willingness	  to	  “defund”	  the	  President’s	  signature	  Affordable	  Care	  Act.109	  As	  it	  happens	  these	  days,	  one	  can	  scarcely	  look	  around	  most	  American	  states	  or	  other	  countries	  even	  within	  “the	  West”	  and	  feel	  great	  encouragement	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  any	  modern	  governmental	   system	   to	  meet	   the	  challenges	   that	   it	   faces.	  This	  is,	  I	  should	  be	  clear,	  not	  a	  call	  simply	  to	  “lighten	  up”	  and	  accept	  the	  deficiencies	  well	  identified	  by	  King	  as	  a	  given	  that	  should	  not	  be	  changed,	  even	  quite	  radically.	  Still,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day,	  his	  book	  is	  far	  more	  of	  a	  thoughtful	  and	  interesting	  exer-­‐cise	  in	  political	  theory	  and	  comparative	  analysis	  of	  national	  and	  state	  political	  cul-­‐tures	  within	  the	  United	  States	  than	  a	  call	  to	  the	  barricades.	  Perhaps	  King,	  for	  all	  of	  his	   comparatively	   gentle	   criticisms	  of	  what	  he	   finds	   in	   the	  United	  States,	   believes	  that	   we	   will	   continue	   to	  muddle	   through	   and	   to	   serve	   both	   residents	   within	   the	  country	  and	  foreigners	  who,	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  depend	  on	  American	  leadership.	  If	  that	  is	  in	  fact	  his	  view,	  I	  hope	  it	  is	  correct.	  I	  fear,	  however,	  that	  it	  is	  not.	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